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their breakfasts. The master then said-You refuse duty then; mind
you get nothing coming to you. The men replied-We don't refuse to
do duty, but we want our breakfasts. The master then ordered the
second officer to go ashore and get men to furl the sail. The officer did
so, but none were obtained, and the sail was not refurled until the fol-
lowing Monday evening. No more notice was taken of the men. By
direction of the master, the men were given their meals on Sunday and
slept on board, but were not called out on Monday, and on applying for
breakfast were refused. The men went on shore and asked the master
what he was going to do with them, to which he replied he did not
know them; .they had taken charge yesterday morning, and he would
have nothing more to do with them. The men asked if they could go
ashore; to which the master said, "I don'f tell you to go ashore ;" and
to a request for payment, he said, "No; get it out of the ship if you
can." They then brought this suit, and the claimants defended on the
ground of desertion and disobedience of orders. The court (DEADY,
J.) held that there was no desertion, and decreed for libellants for the
estimated time of the round trip and the price of passage home to the
port of shipment, but deducted one month's wages from the libellants
on account of their misconduct in not obeying the order to refurl the
foresail. The order, he thought, was not an extreme one, and even
though they felt that it was given at the time with the intention to
annoy and punish them, yet the officer had a right to have the sails
furled to please his eye and in accordance with his own notions of what
was seamanlike, and they should have obeyed.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA.
1
SUPREME COURT OF MAINE.
2
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.3
SUPREME'COURT OF NEW YORK.
4
ADMIRALTY.
Jurfsdiction.-A cause of action, to be cognisable in admiralty,
whether arising out of contract, claim, service, or obligation or liability
of any kind, must relate to the business of commerce and navigation:
Peole v. Steamer America, 34 Cal.
Mode of raising issue on.-The only mode of raising issue on the juris-
diction of a state court, on the ground that the cause of action pending
I From J. E. Hale, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 34 Cal. Rep.
2 From W. W. Virgin, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 55 Me. Rep.
3 From C. E. Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 4 of his Reports.
4 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in vol. 51 of his Reports.
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therein belongs to maritime jurisdiction, is by presenting in the plead-
ings the essential facts showing such cause to relate to the business of
commerce and navigation: Id.
WVhere the State is Plaiinti.-Whether a state court would not hold
its jurisdiction of an action brought in the name of the People and in
aid of the public revenues of the state, even though the cause of action
related to the business of commerce and navigation, suggested, but not
decided: Id.
BANKS.
Spurious Alotes.-The defendant having, on the 1st day of July 1863,
paid out to the plaintiff a counterfeit bill, purporting to be issued by
another bank, and the plaintiff having neglected to return it for re-
demption until the 17th day of September following: Held, that if the
duty rested upon the plaintiff to return the bill and notify the bank of
the forgery, within a reasonable time after its discovery, the question
of negligence, under the circumstances, was for the jury to decide:
Burrill v. The Watertown, Bank and Loan Company, 51 Barb.
Hed, also, that when the plaintiff was in doubt, and had no ready
means of detecting the forgery, the duty of returning the bill imme-
diately was not absolute, although its genuineness had been questioned;
and that the duty of returning forged paper, in such a case, must begin,
if at all, from the time the holder has what the jury shall deem satis-
factory evidence of its spuriousness: Id.
Where a person receiving from a bank a spurious note pays it out to
a third person supposing it to be genuine, and the latter neglects for an
unreasonable time, after being informed that it is counterfeit, to return
it, the bank cannot avail itself of such third person's neglect to defeat
the action of the one to whom it bad paid out such note: Id.
The decision in Flowers v. Todd, 6 Hill 340, requiring a creditor who
takes forged bank paper in payment of his debt to return or offer to
return it to his debtor, before he can maintain an action upon his origi-
nal demand, questioned: Id.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Stamp.
CORPORATION. See Libel.
Dissolution- Comityl in Courts of another State.-The judgment of
another state, decreeing a dissolution, and appointing receivers to wind
up the concerns, of a corporation created by its laws, will not prevent
an action commenced against such corporation here, prior to such dis-
tribution, from proceeding to judgment, unless it be shown that the cor-
poration is utterly extinct: Hunt v. Columbian Ins.- Co., 55 Me.
It is not sufficient to show that, by the law and usage in the court of
the state where such decree of dissolution is passed, such corporation
is permanently dissolved, although it still has a qualified existence,
capable of being a party to a judgment there : Id.
The legal authority of receivers, duly appointed in another state, is
co-extensive with the jurisdiction of the court by which they were
appointed : Id.
Comity does not require the S. J. Court of this state to permit re-
ceivers appointed by the court of another state to exercise privileges
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
detrimental to our own citizens, while pursuing appropriate legal reme-
dies here: Id.
CRIMINAL LAw.
Party as Witness.-The Act of 1864, ch. 280, allowing a person
charged with crime to be called as a witness at the trial, "at his own
request, but not otherwise," is constitutional : State v. Bartlett, 55 Me.
The fact'that he does not testify is a proper one for the consideration
of the jury in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused: Id.
Statement of Prisoner, as evidence against him, when not voluntarily
made.-Where a prisoner, accused of robbery of certain money, promised
to point out the place where the money was buried, and afterwards
pointed out a place at which, it was proved by other witnesses, the
stolen money was found: Held, that such statement, when taken in
'connection with said fact and proof, was admissible in evidence against
him, although not voluntarily made: People v. Hoy Yen, 34 Cal.
But when, in such case, in connection with such promise, the prisoner
further stated, "I buried the money there :" held, that this was in-
admissible as evidence against him: Id.
DAMAGES.
Funeral Expenses.-In an action under the statute for causing by
wrongful act the death of a person, funeral expenses are not recover-
able, except as special damages, if recoverable at all, and must be spe-
cially pleaded: Gay v. Winter, 34 Cal.
DEED.
Alteration and Re-delivery.-A deed of warranty duly executed and
delivered, but unrecorded, of one undivided half of certain lands therein
described, may, by consent of the parties thereto, be altered by erasing
the words "one undivided half of;" and a re-delivery of such altered
deed will render it effectual to convey the whole of the premises with-
out a re-acknowledgment: Bassett v. Bassett, 55 Me.
Reading to an illiterate Grantor.-The omission to read an instru-
ment to an illiterate marksman renders the certificate of acknowledg-
ment of no value as proof where the dispute is whether the paper so cer-
tified is the paper that was actually read, or whether it was correctly
read to the party executing it: Suffern v. Butler, 4 0. E. Green.
Ordinarily the burden of proof is upon a party impeaching his own
deed, to show that it is not his deed after it is formally proved. But
where it appears beyond doubt that the grantors are illiterate marksmen,
and that the deed was read to them by the graitee himself, and by him
only, the burden of proof is shifted: Id.
EASEME T. See Water Right.
ELECTIONS.
Returns not to be rejected for Irregularity not resulting in Injury .
Election returns should not be rejected for any irregularity in the ap-
pointment of the officers of election, where it does not appear that any
injurious results accrued therefrom, either by the reception of illegal
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votes or the rejection of legal votes, or that either of the candidates lost
or gained votes thereby: Keller v. Chapman, 34 Cal.
Counting Votes not cast.-It was manifest error for the county court,
when trying a contested election case, to allow to one of the contestants
votes not in fact received, although offered to and rejected by the elec-
tion board; and this, whether the proffered votes were properly or im-
properly rejected: Webster v. Bylrnes, 34 Cal.
EXECUTOR.
Suit by.-In an action of assumpsit, brought by one who sues as ad-
ministrator, the general issue admits the capacity of the plaintiff. The
question of the plaintiff's capacity can be raised only by plea in abate-
ment: Brown, Admx., v. Nourse, 55 Me.
In this state, the rule does not require that the writ should set out
where, or by what authority, the administration was granted: Id.
Power of Court over.-When an executor is also trustee, and the
matters in his charge as trustee can be separated from those confided to
him as executor, this court may remove or supersede him is trustee,
but in such case he will be left to execute and perform any duty devolv-
ing upon him as executor: Leddel's Executor v. Starr and ]Wfe and
Others, 4 0. E. Green.
In proper cases this court will enjoin an executor from proceeding
further in the execution of his duties as executor, and will appoint a re-
ceiver, and direct him to pay over the estate in his hands to the re-
ceiver to be administered under the direction of the court, but in such
case he is not removed or superseded as executor: Id.
Generally, a receiver will only be appointed on bill filed for that pur-
pose, and rarely before answer, except under provisions by particular
statutes. He will be appointed on petition only in the cases of infants
whose position as wards of the court gives them the right to apply by
petititon, or in cases similarly situated: Id.
A receiver will not be appointed as against a complainant upon the
application of a defendant: Id.
EXPRESS COMPANIES. See Stamp.
Liability, as Common Carriers.-An express company is to be re-
garded as a common carrier, and its responsibility for the safe delivery
of property intrusted to it is the same as that of a carrier. It cannot
by a notice, or by an exception in a receipt, which is not shown to have
come to the knowledge of the shipper or holder, exempt itself from
liability in whole or in part, if goods are lost through its negligence:
Beiger v. Dinsmore, .Pres't, &c., 51 Barb.
Nor will proof, even, that such notice was brought to the knowledge
of the owner, be sufficient to relieve the carrier's liability; but an
express contract must be proven: I.
Receipt limiting Liability.-An express company, sued for the value
of a trunk and its contents, which it had undertaken to transport, gave
in evidence a receipt given at the time of receiving such trunk, in which
the liability of the company was limited to the sum of $50. There was
no evidence that knowledge of the contents of the receipt ever came to
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or was brought home to the plaintiff. eld, that a refusal by the court
to submit to the jury the question whether there was any evidence of a
contract between the parties, and a ruling that the receipt was a binding
contract between the parties, and limited the defendant's liability to
$50 and interest, for which sum, with interest, a verdict was directed,
were erroneous: Id.
FRAUD.
Concealment of Facts by Purchaser of Land.-If a purchaser of
land represent to the vendor that a certain mortgage is an encumbrance
on the land, when it is known to him but not to the vendor that the
mortgage was hot as to him an encumbrance, and pays on that account
so much less for the land, this is a fraud on the vendor, and such pur-
chaser will be compelled to pay to the vendor that amount with interest:
Winans v. Winans, 4 0. E. Green.. Facts set up in an answer as a justification of a misrepresentation
admitted to be untrue must be proved by the defendant; the burden
of proof is on him: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
What is Conversion of Wife's Property by Riusband.-The erection
of buildings by the husband on the leasehold lands of his wife, and
collecting the rents, is not such disposition of them as will take away
the wife's right of survivorship, and enable the husband to dispose of
the leasehold estate by will: Riley's Administrator v. Riley, 4 C. E.
Green.
An actual disposition by sale, lease or mortgage, or contract for such
object, is necessary to take away the wife's right of survivorship in a
leasehold estate. A mortgage or a sale of part, or a lease of part, or
for a less term, only bars the wife pro tanto : her right of survivorship
remains in the equity of redemption, and the residue of the premises
or term: Id.
LIBEL.
Liabiliy of Corporation for Acts of its Directors.-The directors
of a corporation are its chosen representatives, and constitute the
corporation, to all purposes of dealing with others. What they do
within the scope of the objects and purposes of the corporation, the
corporation does. If they do an injury to another, though it neces-
sarily involves in its commission a malicious intent, the corporation must
be deemed, by imputation, to be guilty of the wrong, and answerable for
it, as an individual would be in such case: Maynard v. Firemen's Fund
Insurance Company, 34 Cal.
A corporation is liable for acts done by its agents in delicto as well as
in contractu, in the course of its business and their employment; and
the corporation is responsible therefor, as an individual is responsible
under similar circumstances : Id.
A corporation aggregate has the capacity to compose and publish a
libel, and by reason thereof, when done, becomes liable to an action for
damages by the person of and concerning whom the words are composed
and published: Id.
LICENSE. See Water Right.
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LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Suit in one State on Mote barred in another.-The Statute of Limit-
ations is no bar to an action in this state, upon a promissory note made
in another state, when the defendant has not resided here since the note
was given: Brown v. Nourse, 55 Me.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Estoppel.-A person, arrested on a special writ, subsequently and for.
the purpose of procuring his discharge, paying under protest a portion
of the sum claimed in the writ, is not thereby estopped from showing,
in the trial of an action for malicious prosecution, the want of probable
cause in the original suit: .Morton v. Young, 55 'Me.
MORTGAGE. See Vessel.
Right of Tenant for Years to redeem.-A tenant for years who offers
to pay off a mortgage-debt has the right to redeem. Like a second
mortgagee or judgment-creditbr having a right to redeem, he has notperhaps strictly the right to demand a written assignment of the bondand mortgage, but he stands by redemption in the place of the m rt-
gagee, and will be subrogated to his rights against the mortgagor and
the reversioner. He has the right to have the bond and mortgage de-livered to him undancelled, which, insuch a case, is in equity, and may
be at law, a complete assignment: Hamilton v. Dobbs, 4 C. E. Green.
PARTNERSHIP.
Account.-A partner bound to account, must give a clear, distinct,
and intelligible statement of the results of the business, referring also
to particular books, and to the page if necessary, so that a party entitled
thereto may inquire into and investigate its correctness. A reference
to the books of the concern generally, and to former accounts, is not
sufficient: Gordon's .Adm. v. Hammell, 4 C. E. Green.
RAILROAD COMPANY.
Tender of Fare.-In actions for a breach of duty by a railroad com-
pany in not conveying a passenger, it is not necessary for plaintiff to
allege in complaint a strict legal tender of his fare: Tarbell v. Central
Pacific Railroad Co., 34 Cal.
It is sufficient to allege that plaintiff was ready and willing and offered
to pay such sum of money as the defendant was legally entitled to
charge. The transportation and payment of the fare are contemporane-
ous acts: Id.
If the passenger is ready and willing and offers to pay the legal fare
when demanded by the conductor of the train, the railroad company is
bound to carry him, provided there is room in the cars and the passenger
is a fit person to be admitted: Id.
Rule of Damages for Injuries to Land by diversion of Water.-In
an action to recover damages for injuries done to the plaintiff's premises
by the diversion of a stream from its channel by the defendant, in con-
structing a culvert, the legal rule of damages has- no reference to the
cost of removing a bar of gravel carried there by a flood. The measure'
of damages, in that class of cases, is the depreciation in the value of
the plaintiff's premises occasioned by the injury resulting from the
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defendant's acts: Easterbrook v. The Erie Railroad Company, 51
Barb.
In a case where the deposit is comparatively extensive, and the cost
of removing it would probably equal if not greatly exceed the value of
the soil covered by it, the rule contemplates that the material deposited
by the flood is to remain upon the land; and one of the items of dam-
age is the depreciation in the value of the land in consequence of its
remaining. The owner of the land is therefore under no obligation to
remove the gravel so deposited by reason of his having received com-
pensation for his damages from the wrongdoer; nor does he incur any
peril, in a legal sense, by suffering it to remain: Id.
Hence his neglect to remove such gravel bar will not preclude an
action by him for damages done by a subsequent flood, in consequence
of the improper and unskilful location and construction of the culvert
by the defendants; although such gravel bar may have had some effect
in deflecting the course of the flood. The case will be the same in that
respect as if the flood had been thus diverted by the natural formation
of the surface of the plaintiff's land, or as if the bar had been deposited
there before the culvert was made: Id.
RECORDS.
Of Public Office of another State.-The records in public offices of
other states of matters which are not judicial proceedings, may be
proved by a sworn copy or by certificate, according to the Act of Con-
gress. But when received, their effect is the same as in the state of
which they were records. That effect must be shown by proving the
law of such state upon the subject; it cannot be presumed: Condit v.
Blackwell, 4 0. E. Green.
STAMPS.
On Express Company's Receipt.-A receipt, such as is usually given
by express companies for goods delivered to them for transportation, is
not subject to any stamp duty, but is covered by the exception in the
Act of Congress of 1865: Belger v. Dinsmore, Pres't, &c., 51 Barb.
Stamp on Note.-An internal revenue stamp is no part of the note,
and a demurrer will not lie to a complaint which fails to aver that the
note was duly stamped: .fallock v. Jaudin, 34 Cal.
In order to defeat a recovery on an unstamped note, it must appear
that the stamp has been fraudulently omitted: Id.
STREAM. See Railroad Conmany. Water Right.
SURETY.
Signing of Note does not make Joint Liability.-Two or more per-
sons severally signing a promissory note as sureties do not thereby incur
a joint liability: Bunker v. Tufts, 55 Me.
Such sureties cannot maintain a joint action on the case against a per-
son who subsequently "aids or assists" their principal "in a fraudulent
transfer or concealment of his property, to secure it from creditors,"
although, after such conveyance, they became joint creditors by the
joint payment of said note: Id.
When several sureties pay the debt of their principal, and there is no
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evidence of a partnership or joint interest, or of payment from a joint
fund, the presumption of law is that each paid his proportion of the
debt Id.
TENANT roR LiuE. See Trust.
Tow-BOATS.
Owners not Carriers.-The owners of a steamboat employed in the
business of towing boats for hire are not common carriers, and hence
not insurers. But they are liable if guilty of gross carelessness, if not
for a failure to exercise ordinary care in the management of the steamer
and the boats towed: Wooden v. Austin, 51 Barb.
Liability of Owners.-A provision in a contract for towing that the
boat shall be towed "at the risk of the master and owner" of such boat,
refers to the perils of navigation simply, and cannot properly be con-
strued to excuse the negligence of the proprietors of the towing vessel,
or those in charge thereof: Id.
Parties undertaking to tow a boat from one place to another are bound
to do so, unless prevented by causes to which at least gross negligence
on their part does not contribute: Id.
The defendants agreed to tow the plaintiff's boat from Albany to New
York. After proceeding three or four miles the defendant's hawser
broke, and set the plaintiff's boat, with others, adrift, which floated
down the river some 14 miles, without any attempt to regain it. There
was no explanation offered in respect to the strength of the hawser, or
the immediate cause of its breaking, or in regard to the management
of the steamer, or why an effort was not made -to again take the plain-
tiff's boat in tow; although there was evidence to the effect that there
was no difficulty in the steamer taking the entire tow through to New
York. In an action against the defendants for damages occasioned by
their negligence : Held, that the plaintiff was improperly nonsuited : Id.
TRovE.R. See Vessel.
What is Converson.-A person is guilty of a conversion who sells
the property of another, without authority from the owner, notwith-
standing he acts as the agent'or servant of one claiming to be the owner,
and is ignorant of his principal's want of title: Kimball, £xec'x., v.
Billings, 55 Me.
I And it is no defence to an action of trover that the property sold
was government bonds payable to bearer, provided the principal was not
the bond fide purchaser.
TRUST.
"Capital and Income of Stock Dividends.-Where trust-funds, of
which the income, interest, or profits are given to one person for life,
and the principal bequeathed over upon the death of the life tenant,
are invested either by the trustee or at the death of the testator in stock
or shares of an incorporated company, the value of which consists in
part of an accumulated surplus or undivided earnings laid up by the
company, such additional value is part of the capital. This, as well as
the par value of the shares, must be kept by the tlustee intact for the
benefit of the remainder-man; but the earnings on such capital, as well'
as upon the par value of the shares, belong to the life tenant: Van Doren
Y. Van Doren't Trustee, 4 C. E. Green.
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When an extra dividend is declared out of the earnings or profits of
such company, such extra dividend belongs to the life tenant, unless
part of it was earnings carried to account of accumulated profits or sur-
plus earnings at the death of the testator or at the time of the invest-
ment, if made since his death, in which ease so much must be con-
sidered as part of the capital: Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Forfeiture.-W hen the time for payment of the purchase-money has
been extended with the assent of the vendor, and no -ertain time fixed
when payment will be required, the vendor cannot afterwards forfeit the
contract by requiting immediate payment; but the vendee is -entitled
to a reasonable time, after notice, to make his payment: Cytlhe v. La
Fontamn, 51 Barb.
It seems that the vendor may deprive himself of the right to exact a
forfeiture, by afterwards refusing to accept payment upon another and
untenable ground: Id.
Rescinding Contract.-On a sale of a quantity of wood, the pur-
chaser, after he had drawn away a portion, discovered that the quality
of a part of the wood was different from what the contract called for:
Held, that he could not rescind the contract of sale, except by restor-
ing, or offering to restore, what he had received under it: voodruff v.
Peterson, 51 Barb.
Recoupment by Parchaser.-On an executory contract of sale, the
vendee, if he keeps the article, may, it seems, recoup his damages, in
case of fraud, but not for breach of contract: Id.
Fraudulent Representation. -An unconditional delivery of goods
without payment, at a cash sale, does not pass the title, and bind the
sale as to a purchaser upon false and fraudulent misrepresentations:
Hicks & Hathaway v. Campbell and Others, 4 C. E. Green.
V] SSEL.
Registration and Mortgage of.-By virtue of the Constitution of the
United States, Congress has the exclusive'power to provide where the
evidences of title of registered and enrolled vessels, in certain cases,
shall be recorded: Wood v. Stockwell, 55 bMe.
The state legislature has no authority, directly or indirectly, to add
to or dispense with the requirements of section 1 of the Act of Congress
of July 29th 1850, entitled an "Act to provide for recording the con-
veyances of vessels :" Id.
R. S. c. 91, § 1, providing for the registration of chattel mortgages;
does not apply to property in vessels which are duly registered or en-
rolled according to the laws of the United States: Id.
The plaintiff, as mortgagee of one-eighth of a vessel, demanded it of
the assignee of the mortgagor, who refused to comply, denying title in
the plaintiff, and claiming title in himself. The defendant, both before
and after the demand, received one-eighth of the net earnings and had
paid one-eighth of the repairs. In trover: Held,
1. That the foregoing facts constitute a conversion.
2. That the amount paid for repairs should not be deducted in miti-
gation of damages: Id.
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WASTE.
What consttutcs.-Although the common-law doctrine of waste is
not, in its strictness, applicable to the condition of things in this country,
yet such a cutting of trees or timber, by a tenant, as will work a per-
manent injury to the freehold or inheritance, in the absence of any
specific leave or license to cut such trees or timber, is waste, for which
an action will lie, in equity, for the prevention of such injury, by in-
junction, before it is committed, or at law, for the recovery of damages,
by the remainder-man, after the injury is done: _c Ca1y et a. v. Wait,
51 Barb.
Whether the cutting of trees and timber, in any case, is sudh an
injury to the inheritance, or not, is necessarily a question of fact for
the jury, or the court, when the action is tried by the court without
a jury: Id.
WATER RiaIT.
Can onlypass by Deed-License.-A right to divert the water of a
river (owned on either side and to the middle, and subject to no public
right), is an incorporeal hereditament, and can pass only by instrument
under seal: Veghte v. The Raritan Water-Power Co., 4 0. E. Green.
The charter of a water-power company authorizing the company to
divert the water of a river, upon the written consent of the landowners,
does not dispense with the necessity of a deed or conveyance of the
right in the form required by law. It confers the power, but not the
title. Such consent is only a license: Id.
In general, a license at law will create no estate in the lands of the
licensor, but will justify or excuse any act done under it. It is revo-
cable even when given for a consideration, and after it has been exe-
cuted. But, in such cases, where the revocation would be a fraud,
courts of equity give a remedy either by restraining the revocation, or
by construing the license as an agreement to give the right, and com-
pelling specific performance by deed, as of a contract in part exe-
cuted: Id.
But a license to a person to do or erect something on his own land
by which a right or easement of the licensor may be affected, if once
executed, cannot be revoked: Id.
The effect of a license to do an act on the land of the licensee can
only extinguish such easement as may be abandoned, that is, easements
or rights acquired by grant or prescription, and in- no case affects ease-
ments or incorporeal hereditaments which are by law annexed to the
land of the licensor, such as the right to running water passing over
his land in a natural stream or watercourse: Id.
An easement will not be extinguished by mere- non-user for twenty
years, unaccompanied by acts showing an intention of abandonment.
In such cases, adverse possession, as well as non-user, is necessary to
effect the extinguishment: Id.
Damage from Ditches.-Where K. owned a ditch which passed
over the land of R., he was bound to so use it as not to injure R.'s land,
and this irrespective of the question as to which had the older right
or title; and if, through any fault or neglect of k., in not properly
managing and keeping his ditch in repair, the water overflowed or
broke through the banks, and destroyed or damaged the land of R., by
